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Whatdrivesmergersandacquisitions(M&As)in differentinstitutionalenvironments?Thisarticle
builds on the resource dependence perspective and argues that networks, learning, and institu-
tions represent three building blocks that can enhance our understanding of the drivers behind
M&As. Speciﬁcally, we consider ﬁrms as learning actors embedded in network relations and
inﬂuenced by institutional development, and compare and contrast ﬁrms’ acquisition activities
across the United States and China. Our ﬁndings show that there are indeed important learning
and network factors that lead to M&As. More interestingly, the impact of such learning and net-
work factors varies sharply across countries with different market-based institutions. Copyright
 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
What drives mergers and acquisitions (M&As)?
This crucial question has attracted numerous stud-
ies, predominantly with ﬁnancial explanations and
in the context of developed economies (see
Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006 for a review).
One of the leading behavioral perspectives—
known as the resource dependence perspective—
posits that ﬁrms, embedded in relationships and
inﬂuenced by the external environment, can use
M&As to enhance their control of the resources
needed for survival and prosperity (Oliver, 1990;
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). While there is hardly
any debate among scholars on the importance of
M&As, the actual drivers behind M&As are not
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completely known, and how these mechanisms dif-
fer due to institutional disparity is even less under-
stood. In this article, we build on the resource
dependence logic by arguing that (1) networks,
(2) learning, and (3) institutions are the three
underlying building blocks to help us understand
the drivers behind M&As. We do so with a spe-
cial focus on the United States and China, two
important institutional settings with distinctive lev-
els of development for market functions (Boisot
and Child, 1996; Peng, 2003; Robins and Lin,
2000).
Three important motivations fuel this article.
First, from a resource dependence perspective, we
argue that the industry alliance network repre-
sents a pool of resources that ﬁrms can leverage
to engage in M&As through asset, information,
and status ﬂows (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001;
Lin, Yang, and Arya, 2009). While such social
embeddedness has long been argued to be crucial
(Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996), previous work,
with a few exceptions (Haunschild and Beckman,
1998; McEvily and Marcus, 2005; Yang, Lin, and
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Peng, 2007), has not paid sufﬁcient attention to the
role of social context and network embeddedness
leading to M&As.
Second, from a resource dependence perspective
it is important to consider the learning aspect that
drives M&As, as ﬁrms often rely on past experi-
ences for future actions (Barkema and Vermeulen,
1998; Luo and Peng, 1999; March, 1991). To
cope with environmental uncertainty, ﬁrms often
resort to alliances as part of their adaptive learn-
ing processes (Baum, Li, and Usher, 2000; Porrini,
2004). In particular, the ways ﬁrms learn from
their previous alliance relationships through explo-
ration and exploitation may affect their decisions
toward future acquisitions (Cooke, 2006; March,
1991; Yang et al., 2007). While some studies have
incorporated the element of learning in understand-
ing the drivers of acquisition activities, they have
typically focused on the role of acquisition expe-
rience (Haleblian, Kim, and Rajagopalan, 2006;
Hayward, 2002) instead of alliance experience,
which may have different effects. In this article, we
focus on the impact of previous alliance experience
on ﬁrms’ subsequent M&As.
Finally, extending the resource dependence
proposition that a ﬁrm’s control of resources is
affected by the external environment (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978), we argue that the network and
learning drivers of M&As may be subject to the
disparities of the institutional environment. Both
formal laws and regulations and informal norms
and values—collectively known as an institu-
tional framework—have been suggested to inﬂu-
ence ﬁrms’ M&A choices (North, 1990; Peng and
Heath, 1996). However, prior research on M&As
tends to understate the importance of the insti-
tutional environment (Dikova and Witteloostuijn,
2007; Peng, Wang, and Jiang, 2008). Comparing
and contrasting the network and learning drivers
of M&As between different levels of market-
based institutions help highlight the importance
of institutions typically missed in previous M&A
research (Meyer et al., 2009; Meyer and Peng,
2005; Wright et al., 2005). While Western M&A
research (especially that in the United States) has
a long tradition of rich theories and quantitative
methods, research on M&As in relatively underde-
veloped economies such as China has traditionally
been limited to case studies and descriptive statis-
tics (Cooke, 2006; Peng, 2006; Peng, Luo, and
Sun, 1999). Such disparities have called for more
comparative studies (Lu, Tsang, and Peng, 2008;
Tsui, 2007), a gap that this article endeavors to
ﬁll.
Overall, this article departs from previous work
in two signiﬁcant ways. First, we develop the argu-
ment that the drivers of M&As can be revealed
by a focus on networks and alliance learning.
Using industry alliance networks allows us to bet-
ter examine the relational context within which
ﬁrms’ acquisition activities are embedded. Second,
we contend that institutional environments shape
how networks and learning affect M&As. Speciﬁ-
cally, we conduct a ﬁrst comparative study on the
network and learning factors that drive M&As in
the United States and China, thus highlighting the
interactive roles played by networks, learning, and
institutions behind M&As. Our overall theoretical
framework is illustrated in Figure 1.
NETWORKS, LEARNING,
AND INSTITUTIONS
As an important means for ﬁrms to expand and
control resources, M&As have been predomi-
nantly studied by Western researchers in developed
economies (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Hitt,
Harrison, and Ireland, 2001). Most have app-
roached the issue of ‘What drives M&As?’ from
various (but primarily ﬁnancial or economic)
explanations, assuming that acquisitions are the
results of ﬁrms’ stand-alone calculations of cost or
options in response to inefﬁcient market transac-
tions (Folta and Miller, 2002; Williamson, 1985).
While insightful, these lines of research tend to
assume ﬁrms to be atomistic players striving for
short-term ﬁnancial goals.
Such a view may have overlooked the fact that
ﬁrms are increasingly adopting network forms of
organizing and are subject to the inﬂuences of
noneconomic factors (Powell, 1990; Provan, Fish,
and Sydow, 2007). A number of studies have
shown that a ﬁrm’s acquisition choices may actu-
ally be driven by its prior acquisition experiences
(Haleblian et al., 2006; Hayward, 2002), dyadic
relationships (Wang and Zajac, 2007), network ties
(McEvily and Marcus, 2005), and institutional con-
texts (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Park and Luo,
2001; Peng et al., 2008). Such studies have pointed
out some useful drivers for M&As that we extend
in this study. Speciﬁcally, drawing on the resource
dependence perspective, we view ﬁrms as learning
actors that are inﬂuenced by their external network
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Figure 1. Theoretical framework
and institutional environments and can use M&As
to control needed resources for their survival and
prosperity (Hitt et al., 2001; Oliver, 1990; Pfef-
fer and Salancik, 1978). Further, we argue that the
impacts of networks and learning are subject to
the inﬂuences of different institutional conditions,
which may differ in their ability to facilitate mar-
ket functions such as M&As. In short, we advo-
cate (1) networks, (2) learning, and (3) institutions
to be the three building blocks that can further
enhance our understanding of the drivers behind
M&As.
Networks
Firms, like other players in society, are embed-
ded in networks of social and economic relations
(Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996). M&As are sub-
ject to these network opportunities as well as their
constraints. Although researchers have increas-
ingly noted the importance of networks in gen-
eral (Powell, 1990), insufﬁcient attention has been
paid to the role of social context and organiza-
tional embeddedness in the decisions leading to
M&As (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). One stream
of research has examined acquisitions as a parallel
governance choice to alliances due to dyadic inter-
ﬁrm calculations (Wang and Zajac, 2007). Another
stream of research, which our study falls into, goes
beyond this dyadic approach and treats acquisitions
as a complex outcome subject to ﬁrms’ embed-
dedness in the overall network (Beckman and
Haunschild, 2002; Yang et al., 2007). Of the few
studies that adopt a network perspective, the focus
has often been on the role of board interlocks rather
than that of alliance networks (Haunschild, 1993),
which we believe may provide a more natural and
stronger driver to ﬁrms’ M&As.
This network perspective is important to M&A
research as prior studies, especially those based on
ﬁnancial or economic perspectives, tend to regard
acquisitions as stand-alone decisions.1 As a result,
the role of network embeddedness in ﬁrms’ acqui-
sitions has been underexplored (Powell, 1990).
Network embeddedness may also be important to
emerging economy settings, where there has been
an emergence of ‘network capitalism’ that thrives
on interﬁrm relationships (Dunning and Lundan,
2008; Meyer et al., 2009; Peng and Heath, 1996).
From a resource dependence perspective, net-
works are not only channels of resources but also
mechanisms to search and monitor ﬁrms’ strate-
gies and actions (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001).
Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm’s centrality refers to the extent
to which it occupies a central position with ties
to other network members, describing the ﬁrm’s
1 Some studies have also examined whether a particular alliance
may evolve into an M&A, which is different from our focus on a
ﬁrm’s overall acquisition activities (total number of acquisitions)
due to its past alliance experience and network positions.
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ability to access information and resources (Free-
man, 1979; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). A ﬁrm’s
structural hole positions, on the other hand, refer
to its brokerage locations between two otherwise
disconnected ﬁrms in the network, representing
the broker ﬁrms’ ability to monitor and manipu-
late the ﬂow of information and resources (Burt,
1992). These two constructs—(1) centrality and
(2) structural hole positions—have also been con-
sidered to capture important aspects of network
embeddedness (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) and
will be explored further in this study.
Learning
The resource dependence perspective also regards
ﬁrms as learning actors that can accumulate past
experiences for future actions (March, 1991; Pfef-
fer and Salancik, 1978). Such a view is consistent
with the network embeddedness perspective and
important to our understanding of M&A drivers.
For this study, we assume that ﬁrms are boundedly
rational players that can rely on prior experiences
as a means to acquire knowledge and to respond
to the institutional environment (Hitt et al., 2001;
Tsang, 2002). Experience thus becomes a primary
source of learning (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998;
Luo and Peng, 1999).
Of the studies that suggest the importance of
learning in a ﬁrm’s acquisition behaviors, most
have focused on the role of the ﬁrm’s prior acqui-
sition experience (Haleblian et al., 2006; Hayward,
2002; Hitt et al., 2001). We intend to go beyond
such a direct and relatively simplistic assumption
that ‘if ﬁrm A has done B more frequently in the
past, then A will have a higher tendency to do
B again in the future.’ Speciﬁcally, we contend
that learning may be multidimensional in nature
and that the ways ﬁrms learn from their previ-
ous alliance relations may affect their decisions
toward future acquisitions—known as a spillover
effect (Cooke, 2006; Zollo and Reuer, 2001). We
further extend the spillover argument by differen-
tiating the nature of learning in alliances between
exploration and exploitation (Levinthal and March,
1993; Lin, Yang, and Demirkan, 2007; March,
1991). Exploitation enables ﬁrms to engage in
reﬁnement, implementation, efﬁciency, production
and selection, while exploration attaches impor-
tance to adaptive mechanisms that call for exper-
imentation, variation, search, and innovation
(March, 1991). In this study, we contend that
exploratory learning and exploitative learning in
alliances may differentially affect ﬁrms’ tendencies
in subsequent acquisitions.
Institutional environments
As strategic choices, acquisitions are not only
driven by ﬁrms’ industry relations and past expe-
riences, but are a reﬂection of the institutional
constraints faced by ﬁrms (Rodriguez, Uhlen-
bruck, and Eden, 2005; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003).
According to Scott, ‘it is difﬁcult if not impossi-
ble to discern the effects of institutions on social
structures and behaviors if all our cases are embed-
ded in the same or very similar ones’ (Scott, 1995:
146). Various scholars have also echoed the view
on how the institutional environment can affect a
ﬁrm’s behavior (Gold, Guthrie, and Wank, 2002;
Peng and Heath, 1996; Robins and Lin, 2000; Zhou
and Li, 2007).
Traditional research tends to be criticized for
largely ignoring the institutional underpinning that
provides context for the competition among ﬁrms
(Dikova and Witteloostuijn, 2007) or for focus-
ing largely on developed economies (Peng et al.,
2008). Given the importance of the institutional
environment and the increasing interest in emerg-
ing economies, it becomes important to com-
pare distinctive institutional settings and the extent
to which they inﬂuence market functions (Gold
et al., 2002; Robins and Lin, 2000). Emerging
economies, where profound institutional transfor-
mation is taking place, provide an excellent con-
trast to developed economies (Wan, 2005). For
example, Hitt et al. (2004) show that institutional
differences affect ﬁrms’ alliance partner selection
in China and Russia. Yet, rigorous comparative
studies have been rare.
In addition, given the complexity and unique-
ness of each institutional environment, it may be
too risky to simply generalize Western theories
to emerging economies—or vice versa—without
a systematic understanding of the conditions that
may drive M&As in these settings (Li and Peng,
2008; Robins and Lin, 2000; Tsui, 2007). Com-
parative studies have been suggested as a useful
approach to test or generalize Western ﬁndings and
develop theories for emerging economies (Earley,
1989; Tsui, 2007), but have rarely been attempted
(Lu et al., 2008).
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Our study endeavors to provide a ﬁrst attempt
to systematically compare the differential insti-
tutional impact on M&As, extending the line of
research to consider not only structural and behav-
ioral perspectives, but also institutional differ-
ences. In addition, we rely on explanations from
the formal aspect2 of the institutional environ-
ment (e.g., business laws, market mechanisms,
and property rights protection) as it is suggested
to have a more direct impact on market func-
tions such as alliances and M&As, which often
rely on legally binding contracts (Dikova and
Witteloostuijn, 2007). We focus on the United
States and China—two important and distinc-
tive institutional settings. Speciﬁcally, compared
with the United States, China’s formal institutional
framework is relatively underdeveloped in sup-
port of complex market-based transactions such as
M&As (Peng, 2003, 2006; Peng and Heath, 1996).
This is often manifested in strong government
intervention, insufﬁcient legal protection, regional
controls with fragmented bureaucracy, and weak
market monitoring mechanisms (Boisot and Child,
1996; Keister, 1998, 2009; Kovacic, 1998; Li,
Poppo, and Zhou, 2008; Yiu, Lau, and Bruton,
2007).
HYPOTHESES
To examine the drivers behind M&As, we fol-
low the resource dependence logic and argue that,
while ﬁrms’ embeddedness and learning in the
alliance network will affect their subsequent acqui-
sitions, such impact can change due to different
levels of institutional development. Prior research
has also suggested that the effects of network and
learning constructs are likely to vary with differ-
ent institutional settings (Mizruchi, Stearns, and
Marquis, 2006). For example, Burt, Hogarth, and
Michaud (2000) compare the difference in social
capital between French and American managers
and ﬁnd that French managers associate negative
emotions with structural hole positions. Xiao and
Tsui (2007) demonstrate that structural holes play
different roles in China.
2 While not a focus for this research, we acknowledge the impor-
tance of the informal inﬂuences of the institutional environment
(such as guanxi) as studied by Earley (1989), Park and Luo
(2001), and Peng and Luo (2000).
Firm centrality
Of the various measures of centrality (Freeman,
1979), we argue that closeness centrality is the
most appropriate here, as it captures both direct
and indirect relationships and is regarded as an
important aspect of the embeddedness concept
(Baldwin, Bedell, and Johnson, 1997; Gulati and
Gargiulo, 1999). A high closeness centrality
enables a ﬁrm’s independent access to all other
network members in the shortest number of steps.
From the resource dependence perspective, ﬁrms
centered in interorganizational networks are
exposed to more sources of information and have
a higher level of control over relevant resources
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
Whether or not a ﬁrm’s centrality in the industry
alliance network stimulates its subsequent acqui-
sitions, however, would depend on the institu-
tional environment (Peng, 2003). Compared with
an alliance, an acquisition requires higher com-
mitment and entails more risks, while allowing
better resource control by the ﬁrm (Hitt et al.,
2001). In a more developed institutional setting,
the established business environment provides suf-
ﬁcient legal protection for market behaviors. Con-
sequently, a central position in an industry alliance
network may reduce ﬁrms’ incentives to pursue
subsequent acquisitions. Further, the reliability of
market monitoring mechanisms (e.g., government
agencies, ﬁnancial institutions, and legal represen-
tatives) helps ensure the beneﬁt from such alliance
relations for central ﬁrms (Haunschild and Beck-
man, 1998). Potential opportunistic behavior by
peripheral ﬁrms in the network is more likely to
be reduced for a central ﬁrm, which minimizes
cooperation costs and facilitates relatively smooth
collaborations between the central ﬁrm and other
potential partners when there is a resource need
(Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001). As a result, in a
developed institutional setting, a centrally located
ﬁrm may ﬁnd it more efﬁcient to leverage its
strategic position to control resources while less
necessary to pursue acquisitions, which may entail
much higher risks and uncertainty.
Conversely, in an underdeveloped institutional
setting where the business environment is frag-
ile and legal protection is insufﬁcient, a central
position in an industry alliance network may not
ensure the reliability of interﬁrm relationships for
the central ﬁrm (Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2002).
Consequently, there is potentially a high threat of
Copyright  2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 30: 1113–1132 (2009)
DOI: 10.1002/smj1118 Z. Lin et al.
opportunism by alliance partners that signiﬁcantly
increases the cooperation cost, in particular to a
ﬁrm that has to simultaneously manage multiple
relations as a result of its central position in the
network (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Kovacic, 1998;
Zhang and Li, 2008). Centrally located ﬁrms in an
alliance network may have less conﬁdence about
the outcome of their alliance relationships in an
underdeveloped institutional setting. According to
a market failure logic that assumes acquisitions to
be the result of costly or difﬁcult market exchanges
(Williamson, 1985), central ﬁrms in underdevel-
oped environments may be more inclined to take
advantage of their central position in network
relations to acquire others for better control of
resources. In summary:
Hypothesis 1: The level of institutional devel-
opment will negatively moderate the relation-
ship between a ﬁrm’s centrality in the indus-
try alliance network and its subsequent number
of acquisitions. Speciﬁcally, a high centrality
will lead to fewer acquisitions in a developed
institutional setting but more acquisitions in an
underdeveloped institutional setting.
Structural hole positions
Firms occupying structural hole positions can
derive beneﬁts from a network in two aspects.
Information beneﬁts come from timing, access, and
referrals, while control beneﬁts originate from the
‘tertius gaudens’ (literally, ‘the third who bene-
ﬁts’) (Burt, 1992). Compared with closeness cen-
trality, which reﬂects the extent of access to other
network members, structural holes emphasize the
strategic controls of such accesses and are more
dynamic and transitory in nature (Burt, 2002).3
Whether a ﬁrm’s structural hole positions may
encourage or constrain its subsequent acquisitions
may depend on how effectively the institutional
environment fosters the role of structural holes
(Peng et al., 2008). In a developed institutional
setting where established business laws encour-
age and reward market competition, the leveraging
of information and control for strategic advan-
tages through structural hole positions becomes
desirable. Structural hole positions confer efﬁcient
3 In an extreme case, if all ﬁrms in a network are directly linked
to one another, they would attain the highest information access
beneﬁt but the lowest strategic control beneﬁt (Brass, 1984).
access to the private information of other dis-
connected ﬁrms to broker ﬁrms, increasing the
chance of ﬁnding undervalued targets. Further, the
information and control beneﬁts of structural hole
positions are subject to quick decay (Soda, Usai,
and Zaheer, 2004). As a result, brokerage ﬁrms
may have more urgency and incentive to leverage
their strategic positions, allowing them to pursue
acquisitions at a lower cost and with a lower risk.
In an underdeveloped institutional setting, mar-
ket functions may be hampered by ﬁef-like struc-
tures and insufﬁcient legal protection (Boisot and
Child, 1996). Thus, the leveraging of structural
hole positions for potential acquisitions may bring
severe negative consequences and turn into dis-
advantages. Speciﬁcally, an underdeveloped insti-
tutional setting is often associated with a strong
preference for nonmarket mechanisms and old-
fashioned direct or personal contacts (Peng and
Heath, 1996). A broker ﬁrm that strives for mar-
ket manipulations and short-term gains is generally
perceived as untrustworthy in such an environ-
ment (Hitt et al., 2004). Xiao and Tsui (2007),
for example, ﬁnd a negative effect of structural
hole positions on employees’ career achievements
in China. Firms occupying brokerage positions
often encounter substantial distrust and hostility
by others and may not be able to serve as effec-
tive bridges between otherwise disconnected ﬁrms
(Kovacic, 1998). The private information needed
for proﬁtable acquisitions becomes difﬁcult to
come by and even more short-lived. Broker ﬁrms’
intentions for acquisition in an underdeveloped
institutional setting would be interpreted as hos-
tile and they may face substantial resistance from
targets. As a result, while a ﬁrm in an underdevel-
oped institutional setting may enjoy some tempo-
rary beneﬁts from its transitory brokerage position
between disconnected alliance partners, it may face
much higher risks, bigger costs, and longer-term
consequences if it intends to manipulate its bro-
kerage position for acquisitions (Gold et al., 2002;
Wright et al., 2005). Consequently, a ﬁrm’s struc-
tural hole positions may actually inhibit a ﬁrm’s
tendency for pursuing subsequent acquisitions in
an underdeveloped institutional setting. Therefore:
Hypothesis 2: The level of institutional devel-
opment will positively moderate the relationship
between a ﬁrm’s structural hole positions in
the industry alliance network and its subsequent
number of acquisitions. Speciﬁcally, structural
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hole positions will lead to more acquisitions
in a developed institutional setting but fewer
acquisitions in an underdeveloped institutional
setting.
Learning through alliance experience
The M&A literature has argued for the role of
learning and regarded prior experience as a pri-
mary source of learning (Barkema and Vermeulen,
1998; Luo and Peng, 1999). While most have
focused directly on how prior acquisition experi-
ences may affect ﬁrms’ future acquisition behav-
iors (e.g., Haleblian et al., 2006; Hayward, 2002),
we explore a less obvious and more complex
type of learning—namely, experience from prior
alliance formations—while also controlling for
prior acquisition experience.
Speciﬁcally, we follow March (1991) and
assume that ﬁrms are adaptive players with
bounded rationality and limited resources. As a
result, ﬁrms are constantly challenged by the need
to simultaneously exploit existing resources and
explore future opportunities. Although the two are
important elements for ﬁrms to succeed over the
long term (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004), resource
constraints often force ﬁrms to emphasize one
direction over the other at any particular time. In
other words, along the continuum of exploration-
exploitation, some ﬁrms may be more positioned
toward exploitation and others toward exploration
in their pursuit of knowledge and resources (Gupta,
Smith, and Shalley, 2006; March, 1991).
Firms’ exploration and exploitation learning ten-
dencies can also be reﬂected through their prior
alliance formation (Koza and Lewin, 1998; Lavie
and Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel, 2001). Exploit-
ation alliances, which are more focused on short-
term economic beneﬁts as the returns of exploita-
tion in a developed environment, in general, are
more positive, proximate, and predictable than
exploration alliances (March, 1991).
Alliances and acquisitions are fundamentally
ﬁrms’ different levels of response to market func-
tions, with the latter offering better resource con-
trols (Williamson, 1985). Consequently, whether a
ﬁrm may transfer its exploitation learning expe-
rience from prior alliance relations into future
acquisitions can depend on how the institutional
environment supports the utilization of alliance
exploitations (Meyer et al., 2009; Peng, 2003).
Speciﬁcally, in a developed institutional setting,
laws and practices protect and reward efﬁcient
alliance relations. As a result, a ﬁrm may face
less opportunistic behaviors by its partners and
have more conﬁdence in the short-term economic
gains (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Firms with an
exploitation tendency (manifested through more
prior exploitation than exploration alliances) may
have more strategic incentives for economic efﬁ-
ciency. In other words, they may ﬁnd it more
beneﬁcial to utilize alliance relationships instead
of seeking more acquisitions, which also tend to
bear higher market uncertainty and ﬁnancial risks
(Folta and Miller, 2002).
In contrast, in an underdeveloped institutional
setting, legal protection is fragile, market moni-
toring mechanisms not well established, and expe-
riences in interﬁrm governance lacking (Keister,
2009; Kovacic, 1998; Peng and Heath, 1996).
Consequently, alliance relationships may be more
prone to the threat of opportunism (Das and Teng,
2000; Dyer, 1997). This is further ampliﬁed given
the intended short-term orientation of exploitation
alliances, in which long-term relationship build-
ing, by design, becomes a secondary goal. These
conditions greatly increase the risks of exploita-
tion alliances and the costs of managing them. As
a result, ﬁrms may become less comfortable in the
continuation of such relationships (Keister, 1998).
Such market inefﬁciencies or failures (Williamson,
1985), therefore, tend to force ﬁrms with pre-
dominantly exploitation alliances to go beyond
these alliances’ short-term gains and turn their
exploitation tendency into more complete controls
of resources and markets, resulting in more future
acquisitions (Tong, Reuer, and Peng, 2008). Thus:
Hypothesis 3: The level of institutional devel-
opment will negatively moderate the relation-
ship between a ﬁrm’s exploitation (as opposed
to exploration) learning tendency in the industry
alliance network and its subsequent number of
acquisitions. Speciﬁcally, exploitation tendency
will lead to fewer acquisitions in a developed
institutional setting but more acquisitions in an
underdeveloped institutional setting.
METHODOLOGY
Data sources
To ensure valid comparisons between the United
States and China, we collect data from the same
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industry over the period of 2001–2005 (inclusive).
For the U.S. sample, we focus on the electronics
industry (Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation code
36) as it has witnessed many alliance and M&A
activities since the late 1980s (Park and Russo,
1996). Alliance and M&A data are collected from
the SDC Platinum database and veriﬁed using
Lexis-Nexis and the Dow Jones News Retrieval
Service. Financial data are retrieved from Com-
pustat. Information on board directors is retrieved
from the Standard & Poor’s register of corpora-
tions, directors, and executives. Additional data are
obtained from the Economic Census of the U.S.
Census Bureau and Moody’s Financial Online.
Following Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt
(2000), we construct the industry alliance net-
work by two criteria: membership in the elec-
tronics industry and at least one strategic alliance
with another member of this industry. A total of
346 ﬁrms are identiﬁed. Among them, we iden-
tify 57 focal ﬁrms that have relatively complete
ﬁnancial information from Compustat, involving
a total of 81 M&As and 256 alliances during the
ﬁve-year period. A focal ﬁrm’s network embed-
dedness, therefore, is based on its position in the
overall industry alliance network (manifested as
yearly matrices of 346 × 346). Since SDC does
not show the termination date for each alliance,
we use a ﬁve-year moving window to capture the
cumulative nature of a ﬁrm’s alliance portfolio, as
Kogut (1988) argues that the life span of alliances
is usually no more than ﬁve years. Similarly, we
use a ﬁve-year moving window to capture a ﬁrm’s
network embeddedness (e.g., a ﬁve-year moving
window of the industry alliance network for 2001
is based on the cumulative alliances announced
from 1997 to 2001). Consequently, we further col-
lect alliance data from 1997 to 2000, involving an
additional 184 alliances.
For the China sample, we also focus on the
electronics industry, identiﬁed by the Industry
Classiﬁcation Guide of Listed Companies issued
by the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) in April 2001. This is an industry where
alliance and M&A activities began to ﬂourish
in the late 1990s (Peng et al., 1999). Alliance,
M&A, and other ﬁrm-level data are collected
from WIND Data Services, a leading provider in
China for ﬁnancial databases. The study period of
2001–2005 is chosen also because a clear industry
classiﬁcation was available in 2001 and the WIND
database provides comprehensive data coverage on
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial information from 2001.
Similar to the approach used in the U.S. sample,
we construct an industry alliance network of 92
Chinese ﬁrms, identifying 52 of them as focal
ﬁrms with relatively complete information from
WIND and involving 126 alliances and 74 M&As
during the period of 2001 to 2005. We collect
further alliance data from 1997 to 2000 (involving
an additional 69 alliances) and construct ﬁve-year
moving windows to capture the cumulative nature
of a ﬁrm’s alliance portfolio as well as a ﬁrm’s
network embeddedness in the industry alliance
network.
Measures
W eh a v es t r i v e dt or e l yo ns i m i l a rm e a s u r e sf o r
both institutional environments in our study. We
have created the same dependent and independent
variables and matched the control variables across
the two samples.
Dependent variable
M&A Activities. Our focus is to examine the
overall M&A activities of a focal ﬁrm as a result
of its alliance network embeddedness and explo-
ration/exploitation learning under different institu-
tional environments. Therefore, we use the number
of M&As initiated by a focal ﬁrm in each year
to capture its M&A activities, targeting both prior
alliance partners and non-alliance partners in each
electronics industry alliance network.
Independent variables
Closeness centrality. To calculate closeness cen-
trality, we construct the symmetric (nondirec-
tional) matrix for each year as noted earlier
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994) using Ucinet 6 (Bor-
gatti, Everett, and Freeman, 2002). We then use the
command of ‘closeness centrality’ in Ucinet 6 to
calculate the index for each ﬁrm in the network:
C
 
c(pk) =
n − 1
n 
i=1
d(pi,p k)
(1)
where C 
c(pk) is the closeness centrality for ﬁrm
k, d(pi,p k) is the path distance between ﬁrm i
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and k,a n dn is the total number of ﬁrms in the
network.
Structural hole positions. We use Burt’s (1992)
measure of constraint that captures the extent
to which a ﬁrm’s network is directly or indi-
rectly concentrated via a single contact. If a ﬁrm’s
alliance partners all have one another as part-
ners, this ﬁrm is highly constrained and has few
structural holes. Following Soda et al. (2004), we
multiply the value of constraint by −1i no r d e r
to capture structural holes (the ‘opposite’ of con-
straint). Again, a ﬁve-year moving window is used
to construct the yearly industry alliance network.
Exploitation learning tendency (exploitation alli-
ance ratio). Following Koza and Lewin
(1998) and Rothaermel (2001), we analyze the
nature of alliances based on March’s (1991)
paradigm of exploration and exploitation. The
SDC database provides descriptions for each
alliance, such as whether a particular alliance is
formed for purposes like research and development
(R&D) or marketing. In addition, the database also
provides deal description text on the background of
each alliance. We content-analyze both the alliance
description and the background information to
assess ﬁrms’ learning tendencies in the alliance.
Speciﬁcally, alliances that focus on the discov-
ery and development of new technology (such
as R&D and technology alliances) are coded as
exploration alliances, and alliances that deal with
marketing and resource utilization (such as licens-
ing, marketing, and supply alliances) are treated as
exploitation alliances. For example, Texas Instru-
ments and Lucent formed a strategic alliance in
2001 to retail and supply a wide range of semi-
conductors and optical components to Lucent in
the United States. SDC has described this alliance
as being for retail and supply purposes and we code
it as an exploitation alliance. In some special cases
where an alliance is created for both exploration
and exploitation, we code it as 0.5 exploration and
0.5 exploitation (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006).
For the China sample, alliance descriptions are
available in WIND and at ﬁrms’ Web sites. For
example, Shanghai Belling and Shanghai Hua-
hong formed a joint venture in 1999. According
to WIND and Belling’s annual report, the alliance
is primarily for supply chain management, market-
ing, and customer services. These are considered
indicators of an exploitation alliance. Two Ph.D.
students have coded all the alliances indepen-
dently and have achieved a 95 percent intercoder
reliability.
To capture a ﬁrm’s overall tendency for either
exploration or exploration while recognizing the
simultaneous existence of exploratory and exploita-
tive alliances in a ﬁrm’s portfolio, we have created
the following index using the ﬁve-year moving
window.
Exploitation learning tendency
(exploitation alliance ratio)
=
# of exploitation alliances formed by a
ﬁrm in the ﬁve years leading to year t
total # of alliances formed by that ﬁrm
in the ﬁve years leading to year t
(2)
This is a continuous measure of ﬁrms’ learning
manifested through its alliance compositions. A
value closer to one means that the focal ﬁrm has
a larger composition of exploitation alliances or a
stronger learning tendency toward exploitation. A
value closer to zero means that the focal ﬁrm has
a larger composition of exploration alliances or a
stronger learning tendency toward exploration.
Institutional development. We use a dummy vari-
able to represent the degree of institutional devel-
opment, where the United States is treated as a
developed institutional setting (institutional devel-
opment = 1) and China as an underdeveloped insti-
tutional setting (institutional development = 0).
Control variables
We have controlled for the same set of variables
for both the U.S. and China samples.
Cash ﬂow. M&As are constrained by ﬁrms’ ﬁnan-
cial capabilities. Although ﬁrms can undertake
M&As through an exchange of stock or a combi-
nation of cash and stock, cash has been a popular
ﬁnancing medium for acquisitions and has contin-
ued to dominate the other two methods over the
past decade (Hitt et al., 2001). A lack of free cash
ﬂow may constrain ﬁrms’ capability to acquire
other ﬁrms, and we control for this by tracking
their operating cash ﬂow in the cash ﬂow sheet at
the end of each year.
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Firm performance. Past ﬁrm performance is
likely to affect the number of acquisitions
(Haunschild, 1993). On the one hand, increasingly
good performance may create managerial hubris
(Roll, 1986). Managers with hubris may overesti-
mate their abilities to make risky acquisitions. On
the other hand, poor performance may also stimu-
late risky investment (Bromiley, 1991). Firms with
performance below industry norms may aspire to
meeting industry norms; risk taking may increase
as ﬁrms move further and further below industry
average performance. Past performance is mea-
sured by the averaged return on assets during the
previous two years.
Slack resources. Organization slack may assist
managers pursuing acquisitions by allowing greater
ﬁnancial discretion (Tan and Peng, 2003). Fol-
lowing Cheng and Kesner (1997), we opera-
tionalize slack resources as available slack (cur-
rent assets/current liabilities) and recoverable slack
(general and administrative expenses/sales).
Information strength. This refers to the degree
of information exchange through various alliances.
We capture the information strength by resorting to
a similar scheme adopted by Contractor and Lor-
ange (1988) and Nohria and Garcia-Pont (1991).
In this scheme, the degree of information exchange
created by different types of linkages is rated
from 4 (strong) to 1 (weak): technical or R&D
alliances are rated as 4, marketing or manufactur-
ing alliances as 3, licensing or supply alliances as
2, and other alliances as 1. A ﬁrm-level measure
of information strength from alliances is the aggre-
gated ordinal scale for each alliance divided by the
ﬁrm’s total number of alliances in a given year.
Outside director ratio. Agency theory proposes
that corporations with a high proportion of outside
directors may be less likely to undertake diversi-
fying acquisitions, because outside directors serve
to monitor and control the top managers’ oppor-
tunism (Jensen, 1986). However, in China, ear-
lier research by Peng (2004) has questioned this
role. We therefore control the proportion of outside
directors on a ﬁrm’s board.
Other control variables include ﬁrm size (num-
ber of employees of the ﬁrm in a log form),
ﬁrm age, ﬁrm’s number of alliances (number of
alliances formed by the ﬁrm in a given year), ﬁrm’s
number of prior M&As (number of general acqui-
sitions by the ﬁrm before the selected year), debt
on total assets, industry’s number of M&As (in a
given year), and year dummies.
Model estimation
Since the dependent variable is a count variable
(the number of M&As by the focal ﬁrm), it ranges
from zero to a certain positive number, which
is nonnegative and makes it inappropriate to use
standard multiple regression. Although Poisson
regression seems a good choice as it is explicitly
designed for count dependent variables, it assumes
that the mean and variance of the counts are
equal. For most social-science data, the variance is
likely to exceed the mean and result in the prob-
lem of overdispersion, which tends to bias down-
ward the estimated standard errors (Haunschild
and Beckman, 1998; Kogut and Zander, 1992).
The negative binomial model, used in many stud-
ies (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998), overcomes
the overdispersion problem and also accounts for
omitted variable bias and is, thus, adopted here.
Our data have multiple observations for a ﬁrm
over several years, which may raise the concern
of potential interdependence. To address this, we
use a negative binomial model with Huber/White
robust standard errors. Robust standard errors,
combined with the clustering option, have relaxed
the assumption of interdependence within the clus-
ter. We also suggest that ﬁrms’ network positions
and learning alliances should have a lag effect on
their strategic behavior. We therefore lag all the
independent variables and control variables by one
year in the regression analyses. We conduct our
analysis using the negative binomial regression in
Stata V.9.
RESULTS
Tables 1 and 2 present our descriptive statistics.
Year dummies are used but not reported in order
to save space. Table 3 displays the model results
for both the U.S. and China samples. To assess
the potential threat of colinearity, we estimate the
variance inﬂation factors (VIFs) and ﬁnd that no
variable has a VIF greater than 2.13, which is well
below the recommended ceiling of 10 (Kleinbaum,
Kupper, and Muller, 1988). Following Aiken and
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Table 3. Negative binomial regressions on M&A activities
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Control variables
Firm age −0.38 (−2.97)
∗ −0.09 (−0.52) −0.20 (−1.23)
Firm size −0.01 (−1.31) −0.01 (−0.76) −0.03 (−2.33)
∗
Debt on asset 0.02 (2.84)
∗∗ 0.00 (0.36) 0.00 (0.01)
Information strength 0.05 (0.75) 0.02 (0.26) 0.02 (0.25)
Cash ﬂow −0.00 (−0.37) −0.00 (−0.33) −0.00 (−0.04)
Available slack 0.01 (0.20) 0.18 (2.25)
∗ 0.19 (2.32)
∗
Recoverable slack 0.06 (1.66)† 0.10 (2.30)
∗ 0.06 (1.45)
Firm performance −0.01 (−0.63) −0.03 (−1.56) −0.04 (−1.93)†
Outside director ratio 1.31 (3.09)
∗∗ 2.34 (3.78)
∗∗∗ 2.03 (3.26)
∗∗
Firm’s alliance number 0.10 (0.74) 0.05 (0.36) 0.05 (0.39)
Firm’s prior M&A number 0.11 (3.64)
∗∗∗ 0.10 (2.73)
∗∗ 0.11 (2.76)
∗∗
Number of intraindustry M&As −0.00 (−0.91) 0.01 (1.78)† 0.00 (0.14)
Predictor variables
Closeness centrality 0.14 (3.36)
∗∗ 0.12 (3.05)
∗∗
Structural hole positions −0.66 (−2.19)
∗ −0.93 (−2.90)
∗∗
Exploitation learning tendency −0.07 (−0.20) 0.37 (1.05)
Institutional development −2.02 (−2.85)
∗∗ −7.58 (−2.50)
∗
Interactions
Closeness centrality ∗ Institutional development −2.99 (−3.05)
∗∗
Structural hole positions ∗ Institutional development 1.92 (2.61)
∗∗
Exploitation learning tendency ∗ Institutional development −2.05 (−2.59)
∗
N 383 274 274
Log likelihood −349.90 −260.69 −250.04
χ
2 73.23 72.09 93.39
Pseudo R
2 0.09 0.12 0.16
Note: Year dummy variables were included, but not reported here. Unstandardized coefﬁcients are reported with z-values in parentheses
† p<0.1; ∗ p<0.05; ∗∗ p<0.01; ∗∗∗ p<0.001
West (1991), we have mean-centered the predictor
variables before generating interaction terms.
Hypothesis 1 argues that the level of institutional
development will negatively moderate the rela-
tionship between a ﬁrm’s centrality in the indus-
try alliance network and its subsequent number
of acquisitions. The coefﬁcient for the interac-
tion between closeness centrality and institutional
development in Model 3 is negatively signiﬁcant at
p<0.01, supporting Hypothesis 1. To gain addi-
tional insights, we have further drawn the inter-
action plot in Panel A, Figure 2, which shows a
consistent pattern with our prediction.
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the level of insti-
tutional development will positively moderate the
relationship between a ﬁrm’s structural hole posi-
tions in the industry alliance network and its sub-
sequent number of acquisitions. The coefﬁcient
for the interaction between structural hole posi-
tions and institutional development in Model 3
is positively signiﬁcant at p<0.01, supporting
Hypothesis 2. The interaction graph in Panel B,
Figure 2 lends further support to our prediction.
Hypothesis 3 examines the negative moderating
effect of institutional development on the relation-
ship between a ﬁrm’s exploitation learning ten-
dency and its subsequent number of acquisitions.
The coefﬁcient for the interaction between ex-
ploitation learning tendency and institutional
development in Model 3 is negatively signiﬁcant at
p<0.05 in support of Hypothesis 3. The interac-
tion graph in Panel C, Figure 2 reports consistent
ﬁndings for our regression analysis.
Overall, all three hypotheses have been sup-
ported. The ﬁndings suggest that a joint consider-
ation of both network embeddedness and learning
helps to understand the drivers behind ﬁrms’
M&As, and that such drivers differ systemati-
cally between the United States and China due to
their distinctive levels of market-based institutional
development.
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Panel A: Interaction of closeness centrality
and institutional development
Closeness
centrality
Low institutional
development
M&A
activities
High
Low
Low High
High institutional
development
M&A
activities
High
Low
Structural hole
positions
Low High
Low institutional
development
High institutional
development
Panel B: Interaction of structural hole positions
and institutional development
M&A
activities
High
Low
Exploitation learning
tendency
Low High
Low institutional
development
High institutional
development
Panel C: Interaction of exploitation learning tendency
and institutional development
Figure 2. Interaction plots
Post hoc robustness checks
In the previous analysis, our dependent variable is
the overall M&As initiated by a focal ﬁrm in each
year, including the targets of both prior alliance
partners and non-alliance partners in the industry
alliance network. In addition, the above regres-
sions are based on a combined dataset, including
both China and U.S. data. To gain deeper insights
into M&A behavior, we conduct separate analysis
in each institutional setting, and also compare the
pattern of overall M&As with that of non-partner
M&As, which refer to the acquisitions of those
ﬁrms in the electronics industry alliance network
that do not have direct prior alliance relationships
with the focal ﬁrm. According to our theoreti-
cal framework, we may also be able to predict
that a focal ﬁrm’s network positions and learning
tendency can have a bearing on the acquisitions
of indirect partners in the industry network, but
with decreasing power due to an increased distance
between the focal ﬁrm and its targets.
Such an exercise has two useful contributions.
First, our study extends the dyadic approach in
prior research (Wang and Zajac, 2007) and adopts a
network approach, which contends that the sphere
of network inﬂuence extends to both direct and
indirect partners (or targets) in the industry net-
work through access, timing, and referrals (Burt,
1992). Second, although we argue that the same
hypothesized relationships will still hold for the
acquisitions of indirect partners, the magnitude of
these hypothesized relationships may be less when
ﬁrms are loosely connected through intermediates
(Burt, 2007).
To test this argument, we conduct a subsample
analysis for the overall M&As versus non-partner
M&As in two institutional settings respectively
(Table 4). For the U.S. subsample, the signiﬁcance
levels are reduced for all the predictors in terms of
z-values. In the China subsample, the weakening
effect becomes more prominent. The predictor of
closeness centrality becomes nonsigniﬁcant, and
the signiﬁcance level of structural hole positions is
also reduced. This interesting contrast suggests that
compared with the United States, the institutional
environment in China may further dampen the
efﬁciency of the M&A process for indirect and
thus distant partners.
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DISCUSSION
Overall, this study has shown how a focus on
networks, learning, and institutional factors may
signiﬁcantly advance our understanding of the
drivers behind M&As. These drivers have rarely
been jointly examined. Some previous studies
have focused on the construct of tie embedded-
ness (Gao, Xu, and Yang, 2008; McEvily and
Marcus, 2005; Peng and Luo, 2000) or the role
of acquisition experience (Haleblian et al., 2006;
Hayward, 2002), and others have focused on
the context of emerging economies (Hitt et al.,
2004; Meyer et al., 2009; Peng et al., 2008). Our
study extends these lines of research not only
by examining key aspects of network embedded-
ness constructed from real industry alliance net-
works, but also by considering learning as mul-
tidimensional in nature and reﬂected through a
ﬁrm’s prior alliance relations. Most importantly,
we contrast the market-based institutional inﬂu-
ences from two distinctive environments, while
linking them through the common thread of the
resource dependence perspective.
Contributions
At least four contributions emerge. First, this arti-
cle offers a unique perspective to understand ﬁrms’
M&A activities by focusing on important relational
and behavioral drivers, which have been largely
underemphasized in the literature (Cartwright and
Schoenberg, 2006). M&As do not occur in isola-
tion from their social context. Although an atom-
istic or dyadic approach of M&A research has its
contributions, a network approach helps us capture
a broader picture of this critical strategic behavior.
Our study shows that ﬁrms’ structural character-
istics such as closeness centrality and structural
hole positions in their industry alliance network
may have different implications for their subse-
quent acquisitions.
In addition, considering the previous alliance
behavior of a potential acquirer is a sensible exten-
sion that has been suggested in the literature, but
with relatively scant empirical research. In this
study we build on the work of March (1991)
and Koza and Lewin (1998) and link learning
with a ﬁrm’s prior alliance behaviors. Speciﬁ-
cally, we differentiate two types of learning (explo-
ration vs. exploitation) in alliances and ﬁnd that
ﬁrms’ acquisition decisions are not only affected
by their network attributes, but also informed by
their learning tendencies in alliances.
Second, this study has responded to the calls
issued by Meyer et al. (2009), Peng (2003), and
Peng et al. (2008) for more rigorous research on
the role of institutional environments. In particu-
lar, we have moved beyond mere descriptions of
their differences by exploring how they may mod-
erate the roles of network embeddedness and ﬁrms’
learning in relation to M&As. The institutional
aspects of M&As have often been assumed, but
seldom tested and contrasted between a developed
economy and an emerging economy. This study
contributes to both the acquisition literature and
the comparative management literature by system-
atically exploring the role of institutional devel-
opment across U.S. and Chinese settings. We have
not only shown the existence of differences in their
macro institutional environments, but also demon-
strated how such differences may affect M&As.
It has long been argued that ﬁrm growth strate-
gies such as M&As differ signiﬁcantly between
the United States and China (Peng and Heath,
1996), but how speciﬁcally do they differ? To our
knowledge, systematic and comparative investiga-
tion drawing from the same underlying theoret-
ical framework while comparing and contrasting
a developed economy and an emerging economy
has rarely been attempted. Our efforts, thus, paint
the broad contours of an institution-based view
of M&As (Peng et al., 2008). In some sense, our
study has also shed light on the debate regarding
the applicability of Western theories in emerging
economy settings, as we have not only revealed
the differences but more importantly the potential
for bridges (Li and Peng, 2008; Tsui, 2007).
Third, this study has taken one step forward in
expanding the inﬂuence of social network research
by using real, ﬁrm-level strategic alliance and
learning data to shed light on how social net-
works and learning affect acquisitions. This rep-
resents signiﬁcant progress above and beyond the
limited number of previous studies on the link
between social networks and acquisitions, which
have almost exclusively focused on interlocking
directorates (Haunschild and Beckman, 1998).
Fourth, this study has useful implications for
related areas of research. For example, our theo-
retical framework and methodology can be readily
applied to research on strategic network dynam-
ics by treating ﬁrms as adaptive learning play-
ers embedded in networks of relations (Lin et al.,
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2007; Lin et al., 2008; Osborn and Hagedoorn,
1997). Further, our perspective can help advance
knowledge transfer research given that knowledge
transfer is fundamentally the result of intra- and
interﬁrm interactions of ﬁrms’ past experiences,
while subject to the inﬂuence of the environment
(Arya and Lin, 2007; Lu et al., 2008; van Wijk,
Jansen, and Lyles, 2008).
The contributions from this study also have
important implications for practitioners. Our study
advises ﬁrms to better understand the impact of
their institutional environment, and to know when
and how to leverage their network positions and
prior experiences for strategic advantages. Under-
standing these systematic differences will be cru-
cial not only for U.S. ﬁrms acquiring Chinese
targets (Cooke, 2006; Peng, 2006; Tong and Li,
2008), but also for Chinese ﬁrms eyeing U.S.
targets (Yamakawa, Peng, and Deeds, 2008; Yiu
et al., 2007).
Limitations and future research directions
The limitations of this study offer opportunities
for future improvement. First, for accuracy and
simplicity we have only studied one industry in
both the United States and China. Caution should
be exercised in generalizing our ﬁndings to other
industries. Second, while we have striven to obtain
comparable measures across U.S. and Chinese set-
tings, there are also disparities due to discrep-
ancies between accounting systems, which may
affect some control variables such as cash ﬂow.
We believe that our overall ﬁndings focusing on
alliances and acquisitions should not be biased due
to this accounting difference. Third, although the
index for exploitation learning tendency has recog-
nized the simultaneous existence of exploratory
and exploitative alliances, it has been compiled
into a single dimension measure for simplify-
ing purposes. Future studies may examine both
exploration and exploitation as two independent
constructs.
CONCLUSION
This study, as a ﬁrst comparative attempt of its
kind, departs from previous work on M&As by
examining both the roles of ﬁrms’ alliance net-
work embeddedness and their alliance learning,
and contrasting their effects across two institu-
tional settings. In conclusion, our ﬁndings suggest
that relational, behavioral, and institutional fac-
tors are not only important, but also promising
for future research on M&As in the United States,
China, and potentially around the world.
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